Voluntary employee disclosures in Australian annual reports applying Ullmann’s stakeholder theory by Kent, Pamela et al.
Bond University
Research Repository
Voluntary employee disclosures in Australian annual reports applying Ullmann’s stakeholder
theory
Kent, Pamela; Windsor, Carolyn; Zunker, Tamara
Published in:
Proceedings of 2011 AFAANZ Conference
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Kent, P., Windsor, C., & Zunker, T. (2011). Voluntary employee disclosures in Australian annual reports applying
Ullmann’s stakeholder theory. In S. Cahan (Ed.), Proceedings of 2011 AFAANZ Conference  (pp. 1-52).
Melbourne: Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 10 May 2019
Bond University
Research Repository
Voluntary employee disclosures in Australian annual reports applying Ullmann’s stakeholder
theory
Kent, Pamela; Windsor, Carolyn; Zunker, Tamara
Published in:
Proceedings of 2011 AFAANZ Conference
Published: 01/01/2011
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Kent, P., Windsor, C., & Zunker, T. (2011). Voluntary employee disclosures in Australian annual reports applying
Ullmann’s stakeholder theory. In S. Cahan (Ed.), Proceedings of 2011 AFAANZ Conference  (pp. 1-52).
Melbourne: Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 25 Sep 2018
1 
 
Voluntary Employee Disclosures in Australian Annual Reports Applying 
Ullmann’s Stakeholder Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
Many companies state in their reports that their employees are the company’s most 
valuable resource (Flamholtz, 1999; Gröjer and Johanson, 1999; Guthrie, Petty and Johanson, 
2001; Mouritsen, 1998; Petty and Guthrie, 2000). The purpose of this paper is to examine 
voluntarily employee 1  disclosures in Australian corporate annual reports by applying 
Ullmann’s (1985) three dimensional stakeholder framework comprising stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and economic performance.  This study first investigates the propensity of 
companies to disclose voluntary employee information in relation to stakeholder employee 
power which is represented by employee share ownership and union membership.  Second, 
strategic posture denoted by corporate governance best practice systems and corporate 
mission statements are examined. Return on assets (ROA) and market oriented Tobin’s Q are 
proxies used for economic performance. Finally, the quality of employee disclosures using 
content analysis are examined also using Ullmann’s (1985) three dimensional model.  
The research question addressed is as follows: Why do Australian publicly listed 
companies voluntarily disclose employee information in their annual reports? The 
Corporations Law, various Accounting Standards and the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) do not require employee disclosures2 with the exception of mandatory information 
relating to employee benefits (Kent and Chan, 2009). Australian companies however, are 
                                                 
1
 An employee is a person employed in a calling on wages or piecework rates; or a person whose usual occupation is that of an employee in 
a calling; or a person employed in a calling, even though the person is working under a contract for labour only, or substantially for labour 
only; or the person is a lessee of tools or other implements of production, or of a vehicle used to deliver goods; or the person owns, wholly 
or partly, a vehicle used to transport goods or passengers; or a person who is a member of a class of persons declared to be employees under 
section 275; or each person, being 1 of 4 or more persons who are, or claim to be, partners working in association in a calling or business; or 
for proceedings for payment or recovery of amounts—a former employee; or an outworker; or an apprentice or trainee (Industrial Relations 
Act, 1999). 
2
 There are several general reporting requirements that are relevant to the social environment. For example, “Australian companies are 
required to provide true and fair balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and to disclose information about contingent liabilities and 
material after balance date events. Such requirements could relate to particular social issues associated with a company’s operations. The 
only specific corporate reporting requirement of an employee nature is that Australian companies must recognise a liability when an 
employee has provided service in exchange for employee benefits to be paid in the future, or to recognise an expense when the entity 
consumes the economic benefits arising from services provided by an employee in exchange for employee benefits” (Kent & Zunker, 2010). 
This requirement is embodied in AASB 119 “Employee Benefits” which became effective in April 2007. 
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continuing to provide voluntary social information within their annual reports and the amount 
of disclosure is exponentially increasing over time (Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Tilt, 2004).   
In 2006, a Federal Government enquiry into whether corporate social reporting (CSR) 
should be mandatory, recommended that CSR remain voluntary and unregulated (The 
Commonwealth Government of Australia, 2006a). The enquiry further concluded that the 
current Corporations Act gave directors adequate guidance for providing non-financial 
information such as employee related reporting by listed companies (The Commonwealth 
Government of Australia, 2006b). Thus corporate governance plays an important role in the 
provision of employee disclosures by Australian companies. 
Little attention has been given to the role of corporate governance systems, corporate 
mission statements, employee share ownership and union membership associated with 
voluntary employee related disclosures in annual reports despite the importance placed on 
employees by many companies. Several studies have examined eclectic aspects, policies and 
practices of employee disclosures in corporate social responsibility reports with researchers 
using various theoretical and methodological approaches (see Spence, Husillos and Correa-
Ruiz 2010, for an extensive critical literature review and Owen, 2008 for a critiqued 
overview of CSR). 
 
1.1 Demand for Voluntary Employee Reporting 
Numerous underlying principles exist for managers to voluntarily disclose employee 
information in the annual report. One incentive is the desire to comply with legal and 
professional requirements (Jamali, 2008; Van Dongen, 2006).  Social disclosures and related 
verifications are not mandated in Australia (Deegan, 2000). Economic rationality concerns 
might be considered another important reason.  In particular, there could be benefits for the 
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company in appearing to act responsibly by their employees and this could be deemed to be 
more important than acknowledging other social responsibilities of the company (Deegan, 
2002; Friedman, 1962).  
Another benefit is attempting to be an accountable or responsible company by 
reporting information voluntarily. Managers are likely to consider that stakeholders have a 
right to certain information, and that they should fulfil that entitlement (Deegan, 2002; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Hasnas, 1998; Wilmhurst and Frost, 
2000) despite the related costs.  Complying with borrowing requirements is another incentive 
to provide voluntary employee information. Corporate lending institutions require, as an 
element of their risk assessment policies, borrowers to regularly supply certain information 
about their social policies and performance. Also, managers are expected to conform to 
community expectations, to appear as though they are complying with the ‘social contract’, 
and this is reliant upon providing evidence of positive social performance (Abeysekera, 2006; 
Aerts, Cormier and Magnan, 2006; Deegan, 2000, 2002).  
Benefits such as managing particular stakeholder groups (see Neu Warsame and 
Pedwell, 1998; Roberts, 1992; Ullmann, 1985) and the compliance of industry requirements 
or particular codes of conduct (see Deegan and Blomquist, 2001) are additional motivations 
that encourage management to disclose social responsibility information. Many companies 
also apply to win social reporting awards, thus receiving the associated positive publicity. 
Winning an award for social and environmental reporting could in turn have positive 
implications for the reputation of the company (Bebbington et al., 2008; Deegan and Carroll, 
1993). The desire to legitimise a company’s operations is another reason for voluntary social 
disclosures.  
 
2. Ullmann’s Theory and Hypotheses Development 
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We apply Ullmann’s theoretical framework to this study of voluntary employee 
related disclosures for two reasons.  First, the theory allows researchers to identify key 
stakeholders associated with particular categories of social disclosure rather than focusing on 
a general range of stakeholders.  Second, this theory incorporates an ex ante strategy for 
companies to manage particular stakeholders rather than ex post management after the 
company has impaired their social contract with society.  Ullmann (1985) introduced a three-
dimensional framework of corporate social responsibility disclosure that incorporated the 
elements of stakeholder power, strategic posture and the past and present economic 
performance of the company. Ullmann (1983) argued that the fundamental principle of 
stakeholder theory is that companies use social disclosures as a means to manage their 
relationships with their stakeholders and the external environment. Ullmann’s (1985) 
framework therefore is useful to examine employee power, economic performance and 
corporate governance best practices in relation to a strategic perspective of employee 
disclosures.  
 
2.1 Stakeholder Power – Employees 
The first dimension of Ullmann’s model, stakeholder power, is the underlying 
theoretical basis of the framework. Although implied within legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory explicitly refers to matters of stakeholder power, and how a stakeholder’s relative 
power impacts their ability to persuade the company into complying with the stakeholder’s 
demands (Clarkson, 1995; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006; Roberts, 1992). Stakeholder 
demands are more likely to be met when more stakeholder resources are deemed to be crucial 
to the ongoing success of the company. Companies state in their annual reports the value of 
their employees.  For example, Woolworths (2004) annual report states, 
“All of our people, whether in stores or support functions, know our business 
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extremely well. Our employees’ experience and knowledge of how our business 
operates is one of our most valuable assets and contributes to our ongoing success.” 
 
Hence, we specifically examine employee stakeholder power as a vital key to 
voluntary employee disclosures in Australian corporate annual reports.  Stakeholder power is 
viewed as a function of the stakeholders’ degree of control over resources required by the 
company and how critical these resources are to the continued viability of the company 
(Ullmann, 1985). Where stakeholders are deemed powerful and legitimate, their influence on 
the company is guaranteed, since by possessing power with legitimacy, they form the 
‘dominant coalition’ in the company (Cyert and March, 1963). These stakeholders are 
characterised as ‘dominant’, with respect to the legitimate claims they have upon the 
company and their ability to act on these claims (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). Employee 
stakeholders have a legitimate claim upon the company as they provide their physical and 
intellectual labour to produce goods and services in return for wages, salaries or contractual 
income. 
Two under researched factors that support employee stakeholder power are employee 
share ownership and trade union membership.  
 
Employee Share ownership 
The main stakeholders for analysis can also be identified by reference to the nature of 
the power possessed by the potential stakeholder. Freeman (1984) considered that 
stakeholder power could be classified as voting power, economic power and political power. 
Employees can exercise voting power if they participate in employee share ownership 
schemes, political power if they are involved in trade union memberships, or economic power 
indirectly through labour power. Regulators and lobby groups exercise political power 
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through imposing the legal regulation on companies (Kent and Chan, 2009; Wilmshurst and 
Frost, 2000).  
The impact of employee share ownership on the employee-company relationship is 
under researched considering that a transformation has occurred over the last three decades 
when employee share ownership schemes were introduced to distribute the benefits of 
capitalism more widely (Freeman, 2007). In 2004, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
measured the incidence of employee share ownership using statistics compiled from the 
Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership survey, conducted as a 
supplement to the Australian Bureau of Statistics monthly Labour Force Survey in August 
2004. See table 1 that shows increasing employee share ownership scheme participation by 
industry. 
Table 1 here 
In 2004, research commissioned by the Department of Workplace Relations’ 
Employee Share Ownership Development Unit found that ten per cent of businesses surveyed 
had some form of employee share ownership (Landau, Mitchell, O’Connell and Ramsay, 
2007).  Four per cent of businesses surveyed had a broad-based3 employee share ownership 
scheme, which was open to at least 75 per cent of employees.  While 44 per cent of 
companies with a plan had broad-based ones (that is, mostly executive share plans rather than 
broad-based) the majority of plans implemented in the period 2003 – 2004 were open to all 
employees, indicating a move towards broad based schemes. The 2004 ABS data indicated 
that six per cent of a total 481,300 employees held shares as a form of employment benefit. 
Changes to institutions and public policies to protect workers over the last twenty 
years have radically changed since deregulation of the labour market and globalisation. 
                                                 
3
 A broad-based employee share option scheme is available to all employees. 
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Employer preferences for flexibility have meant that employees have the responsibility for 
career development, commitment to a particular kind of work rather than particular employer 
and expected job insecurity. The once long term relationship between employer and 
employee has transformed into short term transactions (Van Buren III and Greenwood, 
2008). Hence employees have been encouraged to participate in employee share ownership 
schemes as a way to build commitment, increase productivity and profits (Freeman, 2007). 
Evidence indicates that employees’ loyalty and willingness to work diligently for the 
company increases when some form of ownership in the company exists (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2010). Employee share ownership also gives workers an opportunity to participate 
in company decision-making (Freeman, 2007) thus giving employees more stakeholder 
power.  
Trade Union Membership 
Very little attention has been given to the link between voluntary corporate employee 
disclosures and trade union membership of employees working for the company. 
The Global Reporting Initiative4 (GRI2, 2002 p. 51) states that  
“The specific aspects for labour practices and human rights performance are based 
mainly on internationally recognised standards such as the Conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and international instruments such as the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, the labour 
practices and human rights indicators have drawn heavily on the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
                                                 
4
 Established in 1997, the Global Reporting Initiative is a joint initiative of the Coalition of Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Its aim is to provide a 
global and credible framework for sustainability reporting that can be used by all organisations (GRI, 2002; 
2006). 
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Multinational Enterprises, which were deemed most relevant to the responsibilities of 
business during the Global Reporting Initiative consultative process.” 
 
Similarly the Global Reporting Initiative 3 (2006) has continued promoting decent 
labour practices guided by the International Labour Organisation and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development which support trade unions as a stakeholder group 
and as a way to engage and protect stakeholder employees.  Little research has examined the 
link between corporate employee disclosures and unions or union membership in spite of 
these recommendations.  
This important stakeholder group should positively relate to corporate employee 
disclosures to enhance transparency and accountability of decent workplace conditions and 
practices as advised by the GRI. 
 
2.2 Strategic Posture 
The third dimension of Ullmann’s (1985) model is strategic posture which clarifies 
management’s reasons for responding to the demands of the stakeholders. Strategic posture is 
considered to be either active or passive. An active posture indicates that managers seek to 
influence, and continually monitor the company’s relationship with key stakeholders such as 
employees, to achieve optimal levels of interdependence and pursue optimal stakeholder 
strategies (Kent and Chan, 2009). For example, when management exercises an active 
strategic posture, and financial performance is good, a high level of social disclosure is 
expected if stakeholder power is also high. In this circumstance, management communicates 
its success across the entire performance spectrum (Ullmann, 1985).  
Motivations for satisfying stakeholder demands stem from the fact that addressing 
stakeholder needs, in this case employees, can be associated with a company’s continued 
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existence, economic well-being, competitive advantage, and the development of trust and 
loyalty among its stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; Magness, 2006; Pirsch, Gupta and 
Landreth-Grau, 2007).  Importantly, strategic posture comes from the board of directors in 
the form of corporate governance structures and plays a key role in managing employee 
stakeholders. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the company, such as the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and reveals the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs (Cadbury, 1992).   
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
(Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council, 2003) were introduced in 
March 2003. Ten principles are recommended in the first ASX Corporate Governance 
Council report in 20035. The Principles are: lay foundations for management and oversight; 
structure the board to add value; promote ethical and responsible decision-making; safeguard 
integrity in financial reporting; make timely and balanced disclosure; respect the rights of 
shareholders; recognise and manage risk; encourage enhanced performance; remunerate 
fairly and responsibly and recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders. Hence a number 
of these principles are associated with the disclosure of employee information (see Kent and 
Monem, 2008).   
Another way for managers to strategically enhance the company is the 
acknowledgement of employees in the corporate mission statement. Mission statements are 
supposed to be the essence of corporate values imbued in their cultures (Peters and Waterman 
1982). Kent and Chan (2009) included the recognition of social and environmental 
                                                 
5
 The ASX Corporate Governance Council released the first edition of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance Practice and Best 
Practice Recommendations on 31 March 2003. On 2 August 2007, the Council released the second edition of the Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations. 
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responsibility in the mission statement as a measure of strategic posture.  In this study, we 
include the recognition of employees in the corporate mission statement as a measure of 
strategic posture. As employees work in the company’s internal environment, recognition 
within a company’s mission statement about the importance of these stakeholders indicates 
an active strategic posture on the part of company management.  
In strategic analysis, the Mendelow (1983) framework is frequently used to 
understand the influence that each stakeholder has over a company’s objectives and strategy. 
This framework seeks to establish which stakeholders have the most influence by estimating 
each stakeholder’s individual power and interest in the company’s operation. The 
stakeholders with the highest combination of power and interest are likely to be those with 
the most actual influence over objectives of the company. Power is the stakeholder’s ability 
to influence objectives (how much they can), while interest is the stakeholder’s willingness 
(how much they care).  
 
2.3 Economic Performance 
The other dimension of Ullmann’s (1985) framework is the company’s past and 
current economic performance. Economic performance is an important element in the model 
for two reasons. First, economic demands have priority over social demands in periods when 
companies have low profitability and high debt (Artiacha, Lee, Nelson and Walker, 2010; 
Ullmann, 1985). Second, a company’s economic performance influences their financial 
capabilities to provide costly voluntary social disclosures to meet the demands of their 
stakeholders (Einhorn and Ziv, 2008) 
 
The following three hypotheses based on Ullmann’s (1985) theoretical framework test 
the propensity of companies to disclose additional employee information when employee 
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stakeholder power exist, they take an active strategic posture and consider economic 
performance.  
H1a: Companies disclose more voluntary employee information in annual reports when 
employee stakeholder power exists represented by employee share ownership and union 
membership.   
 
H1b: Companies disclose more voluntary employee information in annual reports when they 
have an active strategic posture represented by corporate governance best practice and 
mission statements referring to the value of employees. 
 
H1c: Companies disclose more voluntary employee information in annual reports when 
economic performance is higher. 
 
The quality of voluntary employee disclosures is vital for credibility and 
accountability for users and the public generally. The quality of voluntary employee 
disclosures in annual reports is measured with an index comprising 9 employee categories 
conceptually developed from the GRI 2 (20026) reporting standard for labour practices and 
decent work (see Tables 4 and 5). Adhering to Ullmann’s (1985) theoretical framework for 
social disclosure, the quality of voluntary employee disclosures should be related to 
employee stakeholder power, corporate strategic posture manifested in the mission statement, 
corporate governance best practice and economic performance. This leads to the following 
hypotheses. 
 
H2a: Companies increase the quality of voluntary employee disclosures in annual reports 
                                                 
6
 2004 reports would have referred to the GRI 2 (2002). 
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when they have employee stakeholder power represented by employee share ownership and 
trade union membership.   
 
H2b: Companies increase the quality of voluntary employee disclosures in annual reports 
when they have an active strategic posture represented by corporate governance best 
practice and mission statements referring to the value of employees. 
 
H2c: Companies increase the quality of voluntary employee disclosures in annual reports 
when economic performance is higher. 
 
3. Research Design 
Australian companies can choose to disclose employee information through numerous 
media channels and many empirical studies have analysed the incidence or content of 
corporate annual reports, company websites, stand alone social, environmental, and special 
purpose employee reports (for example, Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Campbell, Moore and 
Shrives., 2006; Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995a, 1995b; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002; Robertson and Nicolson, 1996). 
This study focuses on annual reports as the source of employee-related disclosures for 
the following reasons.  First, all listed companies must produce an annual report and statutory 
auditors are required to ensure voluntary information is consistent with the audited financial 
reports, otherwise a modified opinion is given (Australian Government, Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board 2011; Kent and Zunker, 2010). Second, companies have editorial 
control over the voluntary information published in their annual reports and are less 
susceptible to the potential risk of external media interpretations or falsification, possible 
through the popular press (Campbell, 2000; Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Third, the annual 
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report is the central source of corporate communications to investors and other stakeholders, 
and is widely used by companies for various voluntary social disclosures (Campbell, 2000; 
Rockness, 1985; Wiseman, 1982 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The study employs a complete sample of active and listed companies on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) for the financial year ending 30th June 2004. The initial sample 
comprised 1046 publicly listed Australian companies.  From this sample, companies that did 
not have any employees for the year 2004 (for example, trusts or companies who use the 
services of contractors) were excluded from the sample and the final sample consisted of 970 
companies. The year 2004 was chosen because it was the first year of implementation of the 
ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in 
company’s annual reports. These corporate governance practices are applied as one of the 
measures of strategic posture in this study.   
The first model tests the propensity of all companies in our sample to disclose 
employee information while the second model tests the quality of disclosure. 
Model 1:  Binary Logistic Regression 
EMPDi = b0 + b1EMPSHRi +/- b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + 
b6DUALi + b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + b10NOMCOMi + 
b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi + b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi + 
b17BLOCKi + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + 
b22FINANCEi + b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
Model 2: OLS Regression 
QUALEMPDi  = b0 + b1EMPSHRi +/- b2TRADEUNi + b3EMPMISi + b4iNDIRi + b5BRDINDEPi + 
b6DUALi + b7BRDMEETi + b8AUDITCOMi + b9REMCOMi + b10NOMCOMi + 
b11SOCCOMi + b12AUDITORi + b13ROAi + b14TOBINSQi + b15ADVPUBLi + b16SIZEi + 
b17BLOCKi + b18LEVERAGEi + b19ENERGYi + b20TELECOMi + b21UTILITYi + 
b22FINANCEi + b23HEALTHi + b24CONSDISi  + b25ITi + e. 
Where: 
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Variables Description 
EMPDi = 1 if the company discloses employee information and 0 otherwise. 
QUALEMPDi = index of 9 employee categories scored 1 if the company reports that 
employee category and 0 if not reported. 
Employee Stakeholder Power 
EMPSHRi = 1 if the company has a share ownership scheme in 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
TRADEUNi = 1 if the company is in a highly unionised industry, and 0 otherwise 
Strategic Posture 
EMPMISi = 1 if the company discloses employee information in the mission statement,  
   and 0 otherwise. 
Corporate Governance Best Practice variables 
NDIRi = number of directors on the board 
BRDINDEPi = 1 if majority of independent directors on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
DUALi = 1 if the CEO is also the chair, and 0 otherwise. 
BRDMEETi = number of board meetings during 2004. 
AUDITORi = 1 if a Big Four auditor is used, and 0 otherwise.  
AUDITCOMi = 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
REMCOMi = 1 if the company has a remuneration committee, and 0 otherwise. 
NOMCOMi = 1 if the company has a nomination committee, and 0 otherwise. 
SOCCOMi = 1 if the company has a social committee, and 0 otherwise. 
Economic  Performance 
ROAi = return of assets at balance date 
TOBINSQi = market value of the company plus preference shares plus total debt divided  
   by total assets. 
Control Variables 
ADVPUBLi = number of adverse media publicities in the year prior to 2004. 
SIZEi = percentage of employees divided by market capitalisation. 
BLOCKi = percentage of outstanding ordinary shares held by shareholders who own  
   5% or more of the shares. 
LEVERAGEi = total debt divided by total assets in 2004. 
ENERGYi = 1 if the company is in the energy industry, and 0 otherwise. 
MATERIALi = 1 if the company is in the materials industry, and 0 otherwise. 
UTILITYi = 1 if the company is in the utility industry, and 0 otherwise. 
TELECOMi = 1 if the company is in the telecommunications industry, and 0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRIALi = 1 if the company is in the industrial industry, and 0 otherwise. 
HEALTHi = 1 if the company is in the healthcare industry, and 0 otherwise. 
CONSDISi = 1 if the company is in the consumer discretionary industry, and 0 otherwise. 
ITi = 1 if the company is in the information technology industry, and 0 otherwise. 
FINANCEi = 1 if the company is either a bank or an insurance company, and 0 otherwise. 
CONSSTAPi = 1 if the company is in the consumer staples industry, and 0 otherwise. 
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3.2 Dependent Variables 
Employee disclosure (EMPD) is the dependent variable that captures the propensity of 
companies to disclose voluntary employee information in their annual reports. This 
dichotomous variable takes a value of one for a company disclosing information about their 
employees in their 2004 annual reports, and zero otherwise. Three independent researchers 
collected the data using the same criteria as a way to achieve consistency and reliability of 
data. 
The annual reports of the sampled companies were read and passages of text termed 
“employee-related disclosures” were identified and highlighted, a set of decision rules was 
employed to reduce the subjectivity involved in the process of identifying sentences that 
disclosed voluntary employee information. Care was taken to ensure that mandatory 
employee disclosures were not included with voluntary employee reporting.  
Quality of employee disclosures (QUALEMPD) is the other dependent variable where 
the quality of corporate employee disclosures are measured using an index. Several studies in 
the accounting literature have used indexes based on content analysis to capture the quality of 
environmental reporting (see Prado-Lorenzo, Rodrıguez-Doḿınguez, Gallego-Alvarez and 
Garćıa-Sánchez, 2009; Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008; Stanny and Ely, 2008; 
Freedman and Jaggi, 2004). Content analysis is employed to measure quality of employee 
disclosures. The index in this study is constructed of 9 categories of employee reporting used 
in previous CSR studies outlined in Table 2 that are conceptually consistent with the GRI2 
(see Tables 3 and 4). A set of coding rules was developed to guide the measurement of 
quality of employee disclosures. The company’s annual report in the sample is assigned a 
score of zero or one, indicating the absence or presence of employee related reporting for 
each item. The resulting score for a company varies between zero and the number of 
employee categories disclosed. The highest score of quality employee reporting that a 
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company can attain is 9 and 0 the lowest. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 here 
 
3.3 Independent Variables 
Two proxies of employee stakeholder power are adopted. These are participation in 
an employee share ownership scheme and trade union membership.  
Employee share ownership (EMPSHR) is a continuous independent variable that 
measures employee share ownership in our sample of companies. Reported employee share 
ownership as disclosed in the annual reports were included in this study. We expect a positive 
relationship. 
Trade union (TRADEUN) variable is measured as a dichotomous variable taking a 
value of one for a company in a highly unionised industry in 2004, and zero otherwise. It is 
derived from the statistics on trade union membership, classified by industry 7 . These 
industries were reclassified using the GICS industry classification, also used as the industry 
control variable in this study. The classification of either a highly unionised industry or 
poorly unionised industry was determined by the percentage of total employee union 
membership by industry category in Table 5. A positive relationship is anticipated. 
Table 5 here 
Trade union membership information came from the “Employee Earnings, Benefits 
and Trade Union Membership” survey conducted throughout Australia in August 2004 as a 
supplement to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
(ABS, 2010). This survey provides statistics on the distribution of weekly earnings of 
employees, their entitlement to paid leave (holiday, sick, long service and 
                                                 
7
 The Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) was released in 1993.  It was produced jointly by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics New Zealand and is presently used in both countries for the production and analysis of official 
industry statistics.  It is also widely used in administrative systems and other statistical databases. 
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maternity/paternity), superannuation coverage and trade union membership. This information 
can be cross classified by a range of personal characteristics such as age, sex and family type, 
and by characteristics of employment such as full-time or part-time status, industry and 
occupation. The survey also provides statistics on other benefits (goods or services, transport, 
telephone, holiday expenses, medical, housing, low-interest finance, study leave, shares, 
union dues/professional association, electricity, entertainment, club fees, child 
care/educational expenses) that are collected on a five yearly basis (ABS, 2004). 
 
3.4 Strategic Posture Variables 
This study identifies two proxies that signify the nature of a company’s strategic 
posture toward employee disclosures. The first is the acknowledgement of employees in the 
company’s mission statement, and second, the measurement of the company’s corporate 
governance practices. 
Employee mission statement (EMPMIS) is identified as one if the corporate mission 
statement acknowledges employees, or zero if not. This study is unable to establish if all 
companies in our sample have a mission statement but the frequency of those disclosed 
mission statements indicates that many companies see it as a useful means of conveying 
company values to their stakeholders. We expect a positive relationship. 
 
3.5 Corporate Governance System and Best Practice Systems Variables 
This study examines corporate governance systemic practices as an additional 
measure of strategic posture.  Nine individual corporate governance variables outlined below 
are included in this study to represent corporate governance best practices required by ASX 
(2003). 
Number of directors (NDIR) is the number of directors on the board. A positive 
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relationship is expected. 
Board Independence (BRDINDEP) is measured as the majority of independent non-
executive directors to total directors with a majority of independent directors coded one and 
zero otherwise.  We expect a positive relationship 
Board Meetings (BRDMEET)
 
is the number of board meetings held during the 
financial year and measures diligence. A positive relationship is predicted. 
Dual CEO (DUAL) is a dummy variable was also used for dual CEO and Chair with 
the variables taking the value of one if the roles of the chairperson and CEO are separated 
and zero otherwise. We expect a negative relationship. 
Auditor (AUDITOR) is a dummy variable used to test the external audit hypothesis, 
with a value of one assigned when the company uses a Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise. 
It is expected that a company employing a Big Four auditor makes more disclosures relating 
to the company’s employees and that information is of higher quality than those companies 
who use non Big four auditors. A positive relationship is anticipated. 
Audit committee (AUDITCOM) is the existence of an audit committee identified by a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company has an audit committee operating during 
the year and 0 otherwise. Other indicators of audit committee effectiveness are measured by 
the number of committee meetings held during the year, and the number of directors assigned 
to the audit committee. These additional variables were not found to be significant so were 
excluded from the study. A positive relationship is expected. 
Remuneration committee (REMCOM) is the existence of a remuneration committee 
and is identified by a dummy variable with a value of one if the company has a remuneration 
committee operating during the year 2004, and zero otherwise. We predict a positive 
relationship. 
Nomination committee (NOMCOM) is the existence of a nomination committee is 
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identified by a dummy variable with a value of one if the company has a nomination 
committee operating during the year 2004, and zero otherwise. A positive relationship is 
expected. 
Social responsibility committee (SOCIALCOM) is the board committee that oversees 
social responsibility issues and is an indication of the high priority placed upon these issues 
by the company (Cowen, Ferreri and Parker, 1987). In the context of the present study, the 
presence of social committees is argued to be indicative of an active strategic posture by the 
company. The presence or absence of these committees was ascertained through the annual 
reports of the companies in the sample. The variable social committee was coded one for 
companies with established social committees as part of their board structure, and zero 
otherwise. This variable is expected to be positively related to the dependent variables.  
 
3.6 Economic Performance variables 
Return on assets
 
is calculated by net profit after tax divided by total assets and is used 
as the first proxy of economic performance in this analysis. These figures were obtained from 
the company’s 2004 financial statements. A higher return on assets indicates the 
management's ability to utilise companies' assets efficiently in serving shareholders’ 
economic interests (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2009). A positive association is anticipated. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated by market value of the company plus preference shares plus 
total debt divided by total assets (Tobin, 1969). These figures were obtained from the 2004 
financial statements for each of the companies in the sample. This calculation is the same 
method as that used by Chung and Pruitt (1994) and Chung and Pruitt et al. (2010), as the 
financial information used in the formula is available from database sources used to obtain 
other information in this study. The market value is greater than the value of the company's 
recorded assets if Tobin’s Q is greater than 1.0.  This suggests that the market value reflects 
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some unmeasured or unrecorded assets of the company. High Tobin’s Q values encourage 
companies to invest more in capital because they are valued higher than the share price 
(Christensen, Kent and Stewart, 2010). We predict a positive relationship. 
 
3.7 Control Variables 
The adverse publicity variable was collected from the Factiva database for each 
sample company for any published news article from 1st July 2003 to 30th June 2004. The 
database records editorials from all major Australian and New Zealand newspapers. The 
items of news were read and interpreted to determine whether they constituted adverse 
publicity relating to employees based on the nature and content of the items. This method 
was undertaken by three independent researchers to minimise any experimental bias and the 
results compared. A negative relationship is expected. 
Size is measured using the number of employees divided by market capitalization. 
This variable was collected from the number of employees disclosed by the company as at 
30th June 2004 and divided by market capitalisation for the year. A number of alternative 
measures of size have been used in the literature. Sales revenue (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; 
Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Moses, 1987), log of net sales (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; 
Geiger, Raghunandan and Rama, 2005), net income (Deegan and Hallam, 1991; Wong, 
1988), total assets (Hageman and Zmijewski, 1979; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Skinner, 
1994) and log of total assets (Reynolds, Deis Jr, and Francis., 2004) have frequently been 
used as measures. Hagerman and Zmijewskei (1979) argue that no measure of size is 
necessarily better than another. Therefore, the number of employees divided by market 
capitalisation is a proxy for size in this study of corporate employee disclosures. 
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3.8 Industry Control Variables  
Each industry sector is measured as a dichotomous variable, given a value of one if 
the company belongs to the specific industry sector, and a value of zero if the company is not 
classified as a member of the relevant industry. Industry membership is coded according to 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Each industry sector is measured as a 
dichotomous variable, given a value of one if the company belongs to the specific industry 
sector, and a value of zero if the company is not classified as a member of the relevant 
industry (see Table 6). 
Table 6 here 
 
4. Results 
Table 6 shows the industry classification of the 970 sample companies as per the 
Global Industry Classification Standard. The largest representation of the sample is from the 
materials industry with a total of 177 companies, 121 of these companies disclosed employee 
information in their 2004 annual report. The smallest representation of the sample is from the 
utilities industry with a total of 13 companies, 8 of which disclosed employee-related 
information. 
The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the models 
are shown in the table 7 Panel A with the continuous variables and Panel B, the binary 
variables. 
The number of employees varies between companies and industry groups, with a total 
sample range of zero to 89,208 and a mean of 1,212 employees.  This illustrates the 
difference in size and disclosure coverage by companies being analysed in this study. The 
size variable shows an average ratio of 5.97 indicating an average of 6 million dollars of 
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market capitalisation per employee. 
The average percentage of employees who belong to a trade union is 21.8 per cent, 
with the utility industry considered to be the most highly unionised with 52.3 per cent of 
employees belonging to a trade union and the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry the 
least unionised with only 4.7 per cent of employees belonging to a union8. 
An examination of corporate governance practices illustrates the following 
characteristics amongst the sample companies. Board size ranges from a minimum of three 
directors to a maximum of 15 directors, with a mean (median) of 5.06 (5) members. The 
mean (median) number of independent directors on the board was 2.59 per cent (1).  The 
mean ratio of independent directors on the board was 61 per cent. The sample companies had 
an average of 10.53 meetings in the year 2004 with a minimum of one, maximum of 51 and a 
median of 11 meetings. Further analysis indicates that 42 companies (4.3 per cent of total 
sample) held more than 20 meetings per year while 13 companies (1.3 per cent of total 
sample) held only one meeting per year. Evidence suggests that most companies meet 
approximately once a month to discuss key matters. 
Among other corporate governance attributes, 82 per cent of the companies had an 
audit committee, 56 per cent had a remuneration committee, 31 per cent had a nomination 
committee, but only 12 per cent of companies had a social committee. Evidence indicates that 
few companies have a formal structure in place for social responsibility practices. More than 
half of the companies in the sample are audited by one of the Big 4 accounting firms, and 11 
per cent of companies have a dual CEO and chairperson of the board.  
Table 7 Panels A and B here 
 
                                                 
8
 See Table 3 for a summary of trade union membership at the industry level. 
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Table 7 Panel B shows that 98 per cent of the companies disclosing information about 
the employees are disclosing information of a positive nature.  It also illustrates that only 37 
per cent of companies have their mission statement publicly available on either their website 
or within their annual report although only 19 per cent of companies mention their employees 
in their mission statement. Some 54 per cent of companies have an employee share 
ownership scheme in place, while 12 per cent of companies in our sample have a social 
responsibility committee.  
Table 8 presents the correlation statistics between the variables used to test the 
hypotheses. Correlations were performed to provide an early indication of any 
multicollinearity problems which, if found, might pose a threat to the multivariate analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Very low tolerance levels (approaching zero) or very high 
variance inflation factors (VIF) suggest that multicollinearity is a concern.  In this study VIF 
scores are well below the VIF value of 10 that indicates a threat of multicollinearity (Pallant, 
2007). Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
Table 8 here 
 
Following Ullmann’s (1985) three dimensional theoretical framework, we test the 
relationship between voluntary employee disclosures and employee stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and economic performance (see Table 9). Specifically, the dependent 
variable in Model 1 is the propensity of companies to voluntarily disclose employee 
information (EMPD) and tests three hypotheses using binary logistic regression. Hypothesis 
1a tests the relationship between employee disclosures and employee stakeholder power 
represented by employee share ownership (EMPSHR) and trade union membership 
(TRADEUN) which is partially supported.  EMPD is positively and significantly related to 
EMPSHR (p<.01) but negatively related to TRADEUN (p.<.05) in the opposite predicted 
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direction. The results indicate here that employee share ownership empowers employees as 
stakeholders regarding the propensity of companies to disclose employee information. Trade 
union membership appears not to.  
Hypothesis 1b tests the relationship between EMPD and strategic posture represented 
by corporate governance practice systems and a corporate mission statement that values 
employees. This hypothesis is also partially supported. EMPD is positively related to 
elements of corporate governance best practice, that is, Board independence INDEPEND 
(p<.05), number of board meetings BDMEET (p<.05), the existence of an audit committee 
AUDITCOM (p<.01), a remuneration committee (p<.01), a social committee (p<.05) and 
audited by a Big 4 auditor AUDIT (p<.01). EMPD is also marginally but negatively related to 
dual chair and CEO position DUEL (p<.10). The corporate mission statement EMPMIS is not 
significantly related to EMPD.  
Hypothesis 1c hypothesizes EMPD having a positive relationship with economic 
performance, proxies RETURN ON ASSETS and TOBINQ which is also partially supported.  
EMPD is positively related to TOBINQ (p<.01) but not significantly related to RETURN ON 
ASSETS.  
The dependent variable tested in Model 2 is the quality of company employee 
disclosures (QUALEMPD) measured by an index conceptually aligned with the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI2, 2002). Hypothesis 2a tested whether QUALEMPD is positively 
related to employee stakeholder power, that is, employee share ownership EMPSHR and 
trade union membership TRADEUN which is partially supported. A positive relationship 
exists between QUALEMPD and EMPSHR (p<.01) but negatively related to TRADEUN 
(p<.05) in the opposite predicted direction. This result indicates that employee share 
ownership empowers employee stakeholders regarding companies providing quality 
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employee disclosures. In contrast, the results indicate that trade union membership does not 
support employee stakeholder power regarding the quality of employee disclosures.  
Hypothesis 2b examines the relationship between QUALEMPD and strategic posture 
represented by corporate mission statements EMPMIS and corporate governance best practice 
systems.  QUALEMPD is positively related to EMPMIS (p<.01) indicating the reporting of 
quality employee information in annual reports is a corporate strategy to manage 
stakeholders, in this case employees. QUALEMPD is also positively related to elements of 
corporate governance systems: Board independence INDEPEND (p<.10), the number of 
board meetings BDMEET (p<.05), the existence of an audit committee AUDITCOM (p<.01), 
a remuneration committee (p<.05), a nomination committee NOMCOM (p<.01) a social 
committee (p<.01) and audited by a Big 4 auditor AUDIT (p<.05). EMPD is also negatively 
related to dual chair and CEO position DUEL (p<.01) as predicted. These results also indicate 
that corporate governance systems are a strategy to manage employee stakeholders through 
quality employee disclosures.  
Hypothesis 2c investigates the relationship between QUALEMPD and economic 
performance, return on assets and tobin’s Q. This hypothesis is partially supported where 
QUALEMPD is marginally related to return on assets (p<.10). 
Table 9 here 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results show that employee share ownership provided by companies empowers 
employees as stakeholders (Ullmann, 1985) and provides taxation benefits (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2007) providing incentives for employees to purchase shares. Companies introduce 
share ownership plans in the expectation that ownership aligns employee and employer 
objectives to increase productivity and profits. Surveys indicate that many employees want 
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some form of ownership in the company where they work and it should be an incentive to 
increase their loyalty and willingness to work diligently for their employer. The financial 
incentives for share ownership are greater when companies subsidize the purchase of shares 
through a share ownership plan makes (Bryson and Freeman, 2009). Research also confirms 
that employee ownership, on average, does lead to increased firm productivity, profitability, 
and longevity. Additionally, evidence indicates that combining employee ownership with 
increased employee participation is likely to generate very large returns on investment 
(Freeman, 2007).  Freeman (2007, p.1) argues however that 
 “Little is known, however, about management of employee owned firms and few 
projects even attempt to justify societal claims. Economists, managers, and financiers 
remain skeptical of employee ownership, and few studies directly counter their 
concerns. Problems associated with employee ownership go unstudied. For all the 
extent and appeal of employee ownership, it is on the fringe of both social 
consciousness and the academic literature.” 
 
This study has provided evidence on the positive relationship between employee share 
ownership as a proxy for employee stakeholder power in relation to a company’s propensity 
to disclose employee information. Further, this study finds employee share ownership is 
associated with the quality of that information. Hypothesis 2a indicates that employee share 
ownership positively relates to the quality of employee disclosures in company annual reports. 
This result supports the notion that companies are more likely to provide quality information 
about various employee categories (see Table 3), thus empowering employee stakeholders 
with more and better information about their workplace. 
We expected trade union membership to play a positive role in empowering employee 
stakeholders. Instead the results of H1a, a company’s propensity to disclose employee 
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information and H2a the quality of that information were significantly but negatively related 
to trade union membership. An explanation for these unexpected results is that the Australian 
trade union movement has effectively campaigned against further deregulation of the labour 
market. A prominent example in the 2007 Federal election was that the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions actively campaigned against “Work Choices Act” introduced in 2005 by the 
relevant Government to further deregulate the labour market.  Earlier legislation in 1996 was 
the “Workplace Relations Act” that weakened unions in favour of employers (Cooper and 
Ellam, 2008; Buchanan and Considine, 2007). The Australian union movement first 
supported easing of labour regulations during 1980’s but subsequent loss of working 
conditions, reduced real wages and job insecurity exacerbated by privatisation and 
outsourcing made labour deregulation unattractive to many ordinary workers (Buchanan and 
Watson, 2001; Cooper and Ellam, 2008). Hence the union movement actively and 
successfully campaigned for the repeal of the “Work Choices Act” in favour of the “Fair 
Work Act” in 2007 that provided more worker protections and re-introduced the Industrial 
Relations Commission as a forum for unions to stand up to corporate employers. Managers 
pointed out the impact of the regulatory changes in response to a survey about the “Fair 
Work Act” stating that, 
“Managers are spending a considerable amount of time reviewing employment 
contracts in light of award modernisation to ensure they meet the regulations. Some 
employers have had to introduce awards to employees who were previously award-
free while others have had to spend much time transferring employees from one 
contract to another. The introduction of flexible work practices has resulted in many 
organisations dealing with increased requests as well as the need to introduce policies 
and procedures to cover these areas. Compliance with the new unfair dismissal 
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legislation was also noted as having significant impact.” (Abbot, Hearn Mackinnon, 
Morris and Saville, 2010 p. 39). 
 
This evidence indicates that managers responded to increased regulation in the “Fair 
Work Act” as a result of union activism. The results of hypotheses 1a and 1b in relation to 
trade union membership suggest that companies were directly reporting to unions and 
therefore had less need to manage this stakeholder power by disclosing employee related 
information in annual reports.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b confirm the strategic role of corporate governance that supports 
the notion of corporate strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985). The predicted positive association 
between elements of corporate governance best practice systems and the quality and the 
propensity of company employee disclosures indicates boards are aware of the importance of 
good employee relations for productivity and profits. Corporate governance elements tested 
in this study are based on the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations (2003). These elements comprise the number of directors on the 
board,  board independence, the existence of dual CEO and chair position, the number of 
board meetings, the presence of audit, nomination, remuneration and social committees, and 
the audit (or not) by a Big 4 auditor. Hypothesis 2a was partially confirmed with the 
nominations committee insignificant. Hypothesis 2 b indicated higher significance for all of 
the elements of strong corporate governance systems, including the nomination committee. 
This result finds that corporate governance best practice systems enhance more and better 
employee information supporting the notion of strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985). 
Interestingly, the social committee is more highly significant (p<.01) in relation to the quality 
of employee disclosures than the propensity of employee disclosures (p<.05) indicating that 
this committee is strategic key to more and better employee information. 
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The corporate mission statement acknowledging employees is positively related to the 
quality of employee disclosures (hypothesis 2b) but not significant regarding the propensity 
of company employee disclosures (hypothesis 2a). This result shows that companies 
providing more and better employee information use mission statements recognising 
employees as a strategic posture (Ullmann, 1985). In 2004, 52 per cent of the publicly 
available corporate mission statements recognised employees.   
The relations between economic performance and the quality and company propensity 
to disclose voluntary employee information is partially supported and mixed as shown by 
hypotheses 3a and 3b results. Return on assets is marginally positive (p<.10) in relation to the 
propensity of company employee reporting and not significant regarding quality of employee 
information.  Tobin’s Q on the other hand is significantly related to the company propensity 
to disclose employee information but insignificant regarding the quality of employee 
reporting. These results indicate that investors (the market) are interested in employee 
disclosures but are not concerned about the quality of these disclosures. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence about voluntary employee disclosures in 
our sample of 2004 Australian annual company reports. We applied Ullmann’s (1985) 
strategic framework for social reporting comprising three dimensions, stakeholder power, 
strategic posture and economic performance. Specifically we examined the companies’ 
provision and quality of voluntary employee disclosures in relation to employee stakeholder 
power represented by employee share ownership and trade union membership. Evidence in 
this study indicates that employee share ownership does empower employee stakeholders in 
relation to the propensity and quality of corporate employee disclosures. In contrast, 
companies appear to use corporate employee disclosures to neutralise union power in their 
workplace as a regulatory risk management strategy. We also find that companies employ 
strong corporate governance best practice systems to strategically manage employees through 
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provision and quality voluntary employee reporting. Corporate mission statements 
recognizing employees are also evidence of strategic posture, but only for quality employee 
disclosures. Economic performance represented in this study by return on assets and Tobin’s 
Q shows mixed results with   marginally associated with the quality of employee reporting 
while Tobin’s Q is related to the propensity of companies to disclose employee information. 
The following are limitations of this study. We acknowledge that other factors not in 
this study could also explain the provision and quality of voluntary employee disclosures in 
annual reports. Further our study focuses on employee disclosures in annual reports but these 
disclosures could exist in other communication channels. This analysis examines voluntary 
employee disclosures over a single period, for the year ending 30th June 2004.  Other studies 
(for example, Guthrie and Parker, 1989) have shown that corporate social responsibility 
disclosure practices fluctuate over time, therefore, the conclusions reached by this study may 
have limited application across time or in other individual years. There are also limitations in 
the use of content analysis (Gray et al., 1995; Milne and Adler, 1999; Unerman, 2000). One 
limitation is the notion that content analysis captures quantity of disclosure (in terms of 
frequency and volume of disclosure) rather than characteristics of quality disclosures. The 
subject matter being investigated (the narratives of employee disclosure) must be captured by 
the coding instruments (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Milne and 
Adler (1999) emphasised that in order for valid inferences to be drawn from content analysis, 
reliability of the data and the instrument must be achieved. Another limitation is an element 
of subjectivity involved in determining what constitutes a particular type of disclosure (Zegal 
and Ahmed, 1990; Guthrie and Abeysekera, 2006). However, 3 independent researchers were 
guided by an index comprising specific employee items when collecting the data for this 
study’s content analysis to reduce subjectivity. 
 ith Abbott, Dr Bruce Hearn Mackinnon, Ms Leanne Morris and Dr Kerry S
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TABLE 1: EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP SCHEME PARTICIPATION BY INDUSTRY 
Industry 
% employee 
participation in share 
ownership scheme 
Education 0.1 
Accommodation and food services 0.7 
Other services 1.1 
Health care and social assistance 1.6 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.1 
Construction 4.6 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services 4.7 
Arts and recreation services 4.9 
Property and business services 6.3 
Retail trade 6.4 
Wholesale trade 7.4 
Manufacturing 7.9 
Transport, postal and warehousing 9.2 
Communication services 16 
Mining 16.4 
Finance and insurance services 32.3 
Average 5.9 
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TABLE 2 : CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE DISCLOSURE BY OTHER RESEARCHERS 
Authors Types of Employee-related Disclosure 
1978 Ernst and Ernst  1. Human resources:  
2. employee health and safety  
3. employee training;  
4. other human resource disclosures; 
Clarkson (1988) 
 
1. communications with employees;  
2. training and development;  
3. career-planning;  
4. retirement and termination counseling;  
5. lay- offs, redundancies and plant closings;  
6. stress and mental health;  
7. absenteeism and turnover;  
8. health and safety;  
9. employment equity and discrimination;  
10. women in management;  
11. performance appraisal;  
12. day care 
Gray et al (1995a)  
 
1. consultation with employees;  
2. employee share ownership;  
3. employment of disabled; 
4. employment data;  
5. pension commitments;  
6. value added statements; 
7. health and safety;  
8. employee other. 
Menassa (2010) 
 
1. employee morale;  
2. training and development;  
3. employee profile;  
4. employee share purchase schemes;  
5. employee health and safety;  
6. employee relations; 
7. employee remuneration;  
8. employee assistance benefit;  
9. equal opportunity practices;  
10. job creation 
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TABLE 3: CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE DISCLOSURES 
Categories Global Reporting Index 2002 see 
Table 5 
1 Employee profiles LA1, LA2 
2 Employee assistance or benefits LA12 
3 Industrial relations LA3, LA4, LA13 
4 Health and safety LA5, LA6, LA7, LA8, LA14, LA15 
5 Employee training and development LA9, LA16, LA17 
6 Employee remuneration LA12 
7 Employment of minorities or women LA10, LA11 
8 Employee morale n/a 
9 Other n/a 
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TABLE 4: GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE (2002) 
 Core Indicators  Additional Indicators 
 Employment  
LA1
  
Breakdown of workforce where possible by region/ country, status (employee/non-employee), employment type 
(full-time/part-time) and employment contract (indefinite, permanent/ fixed term or temporary. Also identify 
workforce retained in conjunction with other employers (temporary agency workers or workers in co-employment 
relationships segmented by region/region. 
LA 12 
Employee benefits beyond those legally mandated (e.g. 
contributions to health care, disability, maternity, education and 
retirement). 
LA2 Net employment creation number and turnover segmented by region or country.  
 Labour/Management Relations  
LA3 Percentage of employees represented by an independent  trade union or other bona fide employee representatives 
broken down geographically  or percentage of employees  covered by collective bargaining agreements broken 
down by region /country. 
LA 13 
Provision for formal worker representation in decision making 
or management including corporate governance 
LA4 Policies and procedures involving information and consultation with employees over changes in reporting 
organisation’s operations (restructuring). 
 Health and Safety  
LA5 Practices on recording a notification of occupational accidents and diseases and how they relate to ILO Code of 
Practice of Recording and Notification of Occupational Accidents and Diseases. 
LA 14 
Evidence of substantial compliance with ILO Guidelines for 
Occupational Health and Safety Systems.  
LA6 Description of joint health and safety committees comprising management and worker representatives and the 
proportion of the workforce covered by such committees, 
LA 15 
Description of formal agreements with representative trade 
unions or other bona fide representatives covering health and 
safety at work and the proportion of the workforce covered by 
such agreements. 
LA7 Standard injury, lost day and absentee rates and the number of work related fatalities (including sub-contracted 
workers). 
 
LA8 Policies and processes (for the workplace and beyond) for HIV AIDS.   
 Training and Education  
LA9 Average hours of training per year per employee category of employee. (e.g. senior management, middle 
management, professional, technical, administrative , production and maintenance). 
LA 16 
Description of programmes to support continuing employability 
of employees and manage career endings. 
  LA 17 
Specific policies and programmes for skills management and 
lifelong learning. 
 Diversity and Opportunity  
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LA10 Description of equal opportunity policies and programmes as well as monitoring systems to ensure compliance and 
results of monitoring. Equal opportunities policies may address workplace harassment and affirmative action to 
historical patterns of discrimination. 
 
LA11 Composition of senior management and corporate governance bodies (including boards of directors) including 
female/male ratio and other indicators of diversity as culturally appropriate. 
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TABLE 5: TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP BY INDUSTRY 
Industry % Trade Union Members 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.7 
Property and business services 6.7 
Wholesale trade 7.8 
Accommodation and food services 8.1 
Retail trade 16.6 
Mining 17.3 
Finance and insurance services 17.4 
Cultural and recreational services 17.6 
Construction 23.4 
Manufacturing 26.0 
Communication services 28.6 
Health and community services 29.0 
Personal and other services 29.6 
Transport, postal and warehousing 36.1 
Government administration and defence 37.5 
Education 44.2 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services 52.3 
Average  22.7 
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Table 6: Industry Classification of Sample Companies 
GICS Industry 
Classification 
Number of 
Sample 
Companies 
% of 
Total 
Sample 
Number of 
Total 
Disclosing 
Companies 
% of 
Sample 
Companies
* 
Consumer Discretionary 125 12.89 92 73.60 
Consumer Staples 48 4.95 34 70.83 
Energy 29 2.99 21 72.41 
Financial 173 17.84 105 60.69 
Healthcare 120 12.37 88 73.33 
Industrial 141 14.54 97 68.79 
Information Technology 116 11.96 68 58.62 
Materials 177 18.25 121 68.36 
Telecommunications 28 2.89 15 53.57 
Utility 13 1.34 8 61.54 
Total 970 100 649 66.91 
 
* Percentage of companies disclosing employee-related information. 
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TABLE 7 PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Index employee categories 0.00 9.00 1.67 1.00 1.71 
Size – (Employee No/market cap) 0.002 437.36 5.97 1.60 19.54 
Trade union membership (%) 4.70 52.30 21.81 17.40 8.05 
Block holders (%) 0.00 99.80 39.18 39.84 22.23 
Leverage 0.00 35.51 0.48 0.38 1.46 
Number of directors on board 3.00 15.00 5.06 5.00 1.79 
Number of independent directors 0.00 11.00 2.59 1.00 1.66 
Number of board meetings 0.00 51.00 10.53 11.00 4.98 
Return on assets -595.98 73.50 -0.75 0.02 19.59 
Tobin’s Q 0.10 400.79 4.33 1.47 22.65 
Number of adverse newspaper articles 0.00 45.00 0.68 0.00 3.12 
Number of employees 1.00 89208.00 1212.04 49.00 5692.93 
 
39 
 
TABLE 7 PANEL B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - DICHOTOMOUS 
VARIABLES 
Variable Yes Number of 
Companies 
Presence of employee-related disclosures 0.67 649 
Positive employee-related disclosures 0.98 633 
Employee share ownership scheme 0.54 519 
Mission statement 0.37 355 
Employee information in mission statement 0.19 184 
Board independence 0.61 583 
Duality of CEO/chair 0.11 109 
Audited by Big 4 0.58 561 
Audit committee 0.82 796 
Remuneration committee 0.56 544 
Nomination committee 0.31 298 
Social committee 0.12 113 
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TABLE 8: PEARSON’S BI-VARIATE CORRELATIONS MATRIX OF DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
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QUALEMPD .69**                    
EMPSHR .27** .28**                   
TRADEUN -.01 .01 .15**                  
EMPMIS .08* .20** .10** .05                 
NDIR .28** .42** .26** .05 .18**                
BRDINDEP .13** .14** .06* .02 .06 .12**               
DUAL -.14** -.16** -.08* .05 -.09** -.15** -.07*              
BRDMEET .15** .14** .16** .05 .00 .09** .03 -.05             
AUDITCOM .32** .29** .28** .05 .06 .36** .21** -.18** .20**            
REMCOM .32** .34** .30** .08* .10** .40** .14** -.11** .17** .47**           
NOMCOM .24** .34** .20** -.02 .13** .39** .12** -.07* .12** .29** .52**          
SOCCOM .17** .30** .15** -.01 .14** .31** .05 -.08* .08* .14** .19** .19**         
AUDITOR .23** .27** .28** .04 .10** .36** .10** -.11** .06* .21** .27** .27** .13**        
ROA .08* .12** .06 .06* .08** .12** .03 -.05 .02 .12** .10** .10** .02 .09**       
TOBINSQ -.09** -.04 -.04 .08* .05 -.05 .00 -.02 -.05 -.06 -.03 -.02 -.03 .02 .02      
ADVPUBL .12** .21** .14** .04 .11** .39** .08* -.06 .05 .09** .11** .12** .23** .15** .04 -.01     
SIZE .02 .02 .02 .03 .08* .00 -.02 .01 .04 .01 -.01 -.01 .02 -.01 -.01 -.04 .07*    
BLOCK -.01 .00 -.02 -.03 .00 .08* -.08* .03 .02 .06 .06 .03 -.01 -.01 .10** .00 .06 .02   
LEVERAGE -.03 -.02 .00 .04 .02 -.05 -.01 -.02 .00 -.08* -.04 -.02 .08* -.01 -.46** .31** .02 .05 .00  
ENERGY .02 .02 -.02 -.10** -.04 -.05 .03 .03 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01 .02 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.11** -.03 
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TELECOM -.05 .03 .11** .15** .01 .03 -.01 .04 .00 .05 .03 .02 .01 .02 -.01 -.01 .07* .03 .03 .00 
UTILITY -.01 .05 -.04 .44** -.03 .10** .02 .02 .02 .01 -.01 -.04 -.04 .03 -.03 .01 .03 -.03 .00 .00 
FINANCE -.06 -.07* -.15** -.46** -.06 .01 .02 -.07* -.05 .01 -.11** .01 -.04 -.01 .05 .00 .02 -.02 .02 -.01 
HEALTH .05 .02 .09** .34** -.05 .02 .02 .02 .04 .05 .06 .01 -.04 .04 -.07* .04 .03 -.07* -.12** -.06 
CONSDIS .06 .02 .03 -.22** -.04 .06 .01 -.02 .05 .04 .08* .06* -.03 -.05 .02 -.04 .09** .03 .18** .01 
IT -.07* -.14** .08* .31** .01 -.16** -.01 .07* .04 -.04 -.03 -.01 -.07* -.01 -.14** .05 -.07* .01 .03 .15** 
* Significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed), ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
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TABLE 9: LOGISTIC BINARY AND OLS REGRESSIONS 
 
Independent variables 
Employee 
Disclosure 
Logistic -  Model 1 
Quality of 
Disclosure 
OLS -  Model 2 
Intercept -.68* (1.98) 
.28 
(.97) 
Empshr (+) .67*** (15.45) 
.39*** 
(3.80) 
Tradeun (+) -.03** (3.45) 
-.02** 
(-1.73) 
Empmis (+) .11 (.25) 
.39*** 
(3.22) 
Ndir (+) .08 (1.47) 
.14*** 
(4.20) 
Brdindep (+) .26** (2.69) 
.15* 
(1.57) 
Dual (-) -.37* (2.44) 
-.33*** 
(-2.19) 
Bbrdmeet (+) .03** (2.58) 
.02** 
(1.88) 
Auditcom (+) .70*** (10.16) 
.33*** 
(2.26) 
Remcom (+) .56*** (8.01) 
.21** 
(1.70) 
Nomcom (+) .25 (1.23) 
.46*** 
(3.82) 
Soccom (+) .72** (4.24) 
.73*** 
(4.71) 
Auditor (+) .40*** (5.69) 
.20** 
(1.91) 
Return on assets (+) .06 (.50) 
.09* 
(1.58) 
Tobinsq (+) <.01** (3.47) 
.24 
(-.72) 
Adverse publicity (+) .08 (1.50) 
.03** 
(1.70) 
Size (+) <.01 (.16) 
<.01 
(.56) 
Block (-/+) <.01 (.80) 
<.01 
(-.31) 
Leverage (+) .03 (.23) 
.03 
(.87) 
Energy .29 (.33) 
-.25 
(-.88) 
Telecom -1.10** (5.84) 
-.72*** 
(-2.50) 
Utility .58 (.50) 
1.11** 
(2.20) 
Finance -.47* (3.32) 
-.51*** 
(-3.38) 
Health .27 (.83) 
-.06 
(-.33) 
Consdis -.02 (.01) 
-.36** 
(-2.26) 
It -.22 (.63) 
-.58*** 
(-3.37) 
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Logistic Regression# Nagelkerke R2 equals; .29. 
OLS R2 equals.32. 
Dependent variables are disclosures scores as indicated by the columns. The expected signs 
for the control variables are presented in brackets. Coefficients are estimated by OLS 
regressions. The significance levels are based on t-statistics (presented in parentheses).   ***, 
**, * represent significance levels (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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